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The paper addresses issues related to the accuracy of metacognitive monitoring and the 
effectiveness of control. Based on the enriched model of metacognition (Efklides, 2008), the facets 
and levels of functioning of metacognition are presented as well as the processes underlying each 
facet at the various levels of metacognition. Review of current research on monitoring (i.e., 
metacognitive experiences and metacognitive knowledge) suggests that monitoring can be 
inaccurate but factors such as prior knowledge, feedback, and attending to task context and 
response features can increase accuracy. Control, on the other hand, can be triggered by cognition, 
affect and metacognition. Research evidence on the relations between monitoring and control 
suggests that monitoring accuracy can support more effective control decisions but not always. 
Moreover, control can be ineffective due to lack of resources. What is of interest is that control 
decisions are often influenced by motivational considerations rather than objective task difficulty 
and through effects of affect on metacognitive monitoring. This implies that metacognition should 
be viewed within a broader theoretical framework of self-regulation such as the Metacognitive and 
Affective model of Self-regulated Learning (Efklides, 2011). The implications of the model are 
discussed as well as the challenges for future research on metacognition. 
 






One of the biggest promises – and challenges – of metacognition research is 
the increase of the effectiveness of control people have over their cognition or 
behavior, and particularly students over their learning. In the last 30 years, since 
Flavell (1979) introduced the term metacognition, monitoring and control are 
considered the two functions of metacognition that are inextricably connected 
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between them and with cognition. However, if control is to be effective then (a) 
monitoring should accurately represent cognition; (b) control should inform 
cognition as to what needs to be done, particularly when automatic processing fails, 
and (c) control decisions should be appropriate for the person's goals, task demands 
and situational characteristics. In this article I shall claim that monitoring is not 
always accurate; furthermore, control exerts its effects on cognition through 
cognitive and metacognitive strategies and is not always effective; and third, 
control can be triggered by cognitive, metacognitive, affective, motivational, or 
volitional factors, and, therefore, its effectiveness should be viewed in a self-
regulation framework. 
In what follows I shall first present the "enriched model of metacognition" 
(Efklides, 2008) which posits that metacognitive monitoring can take various forms 
(facets) that function at various levels of awareness, ranging from a non-conscious 
level to personal level (subjective experience) awareness and social level 
awareness. The various facets of metacognition in the various levels of functioning 
make use of different underlying processes and capture different aspects of 
cognition. This has implications for the accuracy of monitoring. That is, 
metacognitive monitoring can be accurate under certain conditions but not others. 
Following this, I shall discuss the relations between monitoring and control and 
claim that metacognitive monitoring and control can regulate cognitive processing 
in a top down or bottom up manner. Moreover, the effectiveness of metacognition 
(monitoring and control) in the context of SRL presupposes the operation of both 
general person characteristics (ability, cognitive, metacognitive, affective, 
motivational and volitional characteristics) that operate across tasks and situations, 
and response to task-specific demands and processing features (Efklides, 2011). 
 
 
The Enriched Model of Metacognition 
 
The classical model of metacognition as depicted in Nelson's (1996) seminal paper 
(see also Nelson & Narens, 1994) posits two levels: the object level that 
corresponds to cognition and the meta level that corresponds to metacognition. The 
meta level is informed by the object level through the monitoring function and 
informs the object level through control. However, this model depicts 
metacognition as if it were one unitary process and does not distinguish facets of it, 
as Flavell (1979) does. Flavell (1979) distinguishes metacognitive experiences from 
metacognitive knowledge, although they are both manifestations of the monitoring 
function. Metacognitive experiences take the form of metacognitive feelings (e.g., 
feeling of confidence) and judgments (e.g., judgment of learning) related to features 
of cognitive processing vis-à-vis the task as the person works on the task (Efklides, 
2006). Metacognitive knowledge, on the other hand, is declarative knowledge 
about persons, tasks, strategies, and goals. It is knowledge we retrieve from 
memory, beliefs and theories we have about cognition and its functioning, about 
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knowledge and criteria of validity of knowledge, about our and others' thinking 
(Efklides, 2006). Finally, there are metacognitive strategies (also called 
metacognitive skills, Veenman & Elshout, 1999), such as planning, which represent 
the control function of metacognition. It should be noted, however, that 
metacognitive control cannot be reduced to metacognitive skills, because control 
can operate by calling in cognitive strategies as well (Nelson & Narens, 1994). 
The enriched model of metacognition (Efklides, 2008) is based on Nelson and 
Narens' (1994) model but makes explicit the facets of metacognition, namely 
metacognitive experiences (ME), metacognitive knowledge (MK) and 
metacognitive skills (MS). Furthermore, it distinguishes three levels of functioning 
of metacognition. That is, there is monitoring and control processes at the object 
level (i.e., cognition) that are not conscious (see Paulus, Proust, & Sodian, 2013, for 
implicit metacognition in young children). These are distinguished from the 
respective processes at the personal awareness level, in which the person is 
consciously aware of the contents of their consciousness (monitoring and control of 
cognition) regarding online task processing and previous encounters with similar 
tasks. Moreover, according to the enriched model, metacognitive processes are not 
limited to the individual. There is growing evidence for socially shared and socially 
mediated metacognition (Iiskala, Vauras, Lehtinen, & Salonen, 2011; Volet, 
Summers, & Thurman, 2009). There are social effects on the individual regulation 
of cognition. This level of metacognition, the social, is depicted as a meta-meta 
level, and this is consistent with Nelson's conceptualization of metacognition in 
which more than one meta levels may exist. 
To illustrate the processes involved at each level of metacognition, one can 
take the following example regarding text comprehension. During reading, 
monitoring at the object level informs on the fluency of the meaning-making 
process (comprehension); as long as the comprehension process runs automatically, 
one goes on with text reading. If, however, comprehension fails temporarily, then 
monitoring informs control, and reading is slowing down (more attention being 
given to the phrases that do not make sense). The effortful processing is manifested 
in the recursive eye movements during reading without the person being aware of 
the back and forth eye movements. However, the person is not aware of the control 
being exerted as long as cognitive processing is restored without a major break 
down. If, on the other hand, despite automatic regulation, cognitive processing is 
not restored (e.g., comprehension processes fail), then the person becomes 
consciously aware of the lack of progress in cognitive processing. Thus, the 
outcome of non-conscious monitoring and control can reach the level of conscious 
awareness (personal awareness level) in the form of metacognitive feelings or 
judgments. In the above example, the metacognitive feeling experienced is that of 
metacomprehension: "I do not understand!" At the personal level awareness there is 
also presence of metacognitive knowledge (e.g., about reading comprehension and 
the factors influencing it): "Some word is probably missing from the phrase that 
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does not make sense". There is also awareness of physiological indicators of effort 
expenditure (e.g., increased attention to specific phrases or unknown words) as well 
as experiences of agency (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Skinner, 1996), in the sense 
that it is "I" who is (or is not) in control of the comprehension process and the agent 
of strategies to overcome the breaking down of the comprehension process. 
Moreover, there is awareness of emotions or affective states related to the task and 
its processing or the outcome of processing (Touroutoglou & Efklides, 2010). For 
example, surprise or frustration that one does not understand what they are reading. 
Finally, monitoring of subjective experiences (metacognitive, physiological, 
volitional, or affective) at the personal level awareness is coupled with observation 
of performance as it unfolds and its outcomes. In the above example, the person 
realizes that they cannot answer questions on the text. This awareness of 
metacognitive experiences in conjunction with performance allows the integration 
of all this information into a single representation of the task, the context, behavior 
and its outcomes as well as the person (as agent) dealing with it in a specific place 
and time.  
Monitoring at the personal awareness level, in its turn, provides the input for 
conscious and deliberate regulation of cognition, that is, use of cognitive and 
metacognitive strategies as well as volitional strategies for the control of emotions, 
motivation, and the environment. Conscious or deliberate control at the personal 
level awareness involves use of cognitive strategies and metacognitive skills. For 
example, use of orientation strategies ("What is exactly that I do not understand?"); 
planning (e.g. "I need first to locate the point where the problem in comprehension 
started, then reread the text and check whether I missed some word or look at the 
dictionary for the meaning of unknown words"); monitoring of the application of 
the selected/planned strategy, and evaluation of the outcome of the strategy applied, 
that is, if comprehension has been restored or the problem persists. If the problem is 
not resolved, then new control decisions need to be made, e.g., abandon effort or 
start a new round of self-regulation of comprehension.  
Another strategy is to ask for help from a fellow student or the teacher. In such 
a case, the student has to explain to the other what is the problem (e.g., "I do not 
understand this sentence" or "This sentence seems to contradict the previous one"), 
and the other person has to represent the student's difficulty vis-à-vis the text and 
one's own experience of metacomprehension. This is an example of the functioning 
of the social-level awareness, where monitoring is based on reflection and 
observation of the subjective experiences, thoughts or actions of the others (vis-à-
vis our own). Control at this level takes the form of instructions to the student on 
what strategy to use, explanations, or joint effort aiming at meaning making, e.g., 
reading and thinking aloud so that the student can follow the comprehension 
process of the partner as it takes place, etc. Collaborative learning presupposes this 
level of functioning of metacognition. The development of science, formal models 
Efklides, A.: 
Metacognition and Regulation of Learning 
5 
of cognition, teaching of thinking skills as well as regulation of cognition in a 
rational manner are also based on this level of awareness.  
 
 
Different Processes in Monitoring and Control at the Various Levels of 
Metacognition 
 
Two implications of the enriched model of metacognition are the following: First, 
there are different processes underlying monitoring and control at the different 
levels of functioning of metacognition. Second, metacognitive monitoring and 
control are influenced not only by cognitive but also by affective factors. In so far 
as the nature of monitoring and control processes is concerned, one can assume the 
following (see Table 1): Monitoring at the object level detects fluency (or lack of 
fluency) in cognitive processing, interruption of processing, conflict of response, 
and error (Koriat, 1997; Touroutoglou & Efklides, 2010), expectations about 
factors that affect memory or cognition (e.g., that the font size of words to be learnt 
affects recall, McDonough & Gallo, 2012), or anchoring on peer performance 
(Zhao & Linderholm, 2011). Control, on the other hand, at the object level involves 
cognitive control (e.g., gaining or losing control depending on contingent 
conditions, Skinner, 1996; forming of abstract rules or task sets, Collins & Frank, 
2013), increase of time, effort, and attention on the task; initiation and termination 
of processing (Nelson & Narens, 1994) and operating of executive functions, 
namely inhibition of response, updating, shifting of attention, and switching of 
response (Roebers, Cimeli, Röthlisberger, & Neuenschwander, 2012; Shimamura, 
2000).  
Monitoring at the personal level awareness is based on awareness of 
metacognitive experiences (e.g., metacognitive feelings and judgments), awareness 
of one's thoughts, task and context characteristics (e.g., online task-specific 
knowledge), and awareness of affective, motivational as well as volitional 
experiences. Processes that give rise to personal-level-awareness metacognition 
vary from non-conscious heuristic, inferential processes based on familiarity and 
cue utilization (Koriat, 1997) to social cognition processes (e.g., De Carvalho Filho 
& Yuzawa, 2001; Yzerbyt, Dardenne, & Leyens, 1998; Zhao & Linderholm, 
2011), conscious analytic processes of the contents of one's consciousness, and 
observation of one's performance and its outcomes. Specifically, metacognitive 
experiences (ME), and particularly metacognitive feelings and judgments, are 
inferences based on heuristic processes that make use of cues from the task, 
context, or cognitive processing (Koriat, 1997; Korial & Levy-Sadot, 2000). 
Metacognitive knowledge (MK) being declarative knowledge or beliefs about the 
object level or the world and the person's prior encounters with specific 
tasks/situations is presumably based on abstraction, reflection and observation of 
one's cognitive endeavors and the accompanying experiences whereas another part 
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may originate from formal instruction and social cognition. That part of MK can be 
explicit. 
Control at the personal level awareness involves the formation and application 
of explicit general task rules that shields task processing from distraction or 
interference (Dreisbach, 2012). At this level control also takes the form of 
selection, use and change of cognitive strategies, such as repetition, spacing, 
allocation of study time, etc (e.g., Karpicke, 2009; Toppino & Cohen, 2010). At the 
personal awareness level metacognitive skills are employed as strategies that 
operate on and regulate cognition (Veenman & Elshout, 1999). Finally, at the social 
level awareness monitoring is based on observation of and reflection on others' 
behavior, performance and its outcomes, on interaction and communication with 
others (Iiskala et al., 2011), and knowledge of formal theories of cognition, based 
on rational, analytic processes (McCabe, 2011). Control, on the other hand, 
involves use of learned strategies acquired through instruction and social 
interaction processes, as well as application of metacognitive skills in social 
interaction or collaborative contexts (Volet et al., 2009).  
 
Table 1. Possible Monitoring and Control Processes at Various  
Levels of Metacognition Functioning 
Monitoring Control 
Monitoring of features of cognitive 
processing: fluency/lack of fluency; 
interruption; conflict; error 
Increase of time, effort and attention on task 
or processing; 
Initiation and termination of processing; 
Inhibition of response, updating, shifting of 
attention, switching of response 
Awareness of one's metacognitive 
experiences (feelings, judgments,  
thoughts, …); 
Observation of performance and its 
outcomes 
Forming and applying general task rules; 
Selection of strategy, strategy use, change of 
strategy 
Reflection on metacognitive experiences 
(one's own and others') and performance and 
its outcomes vis-à-vis the task and its 
context 
Applying metacognitive skills 
Social cognition and interaction with  
others; formal theories of cognition 




Implications of the Enriched Model 
 
Between and Within Person Variability 
 
Since the meta and meta-meta levels are representations of their respective 
object level (i.e., the object and the personal awareness level, respectively) and 
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these representations are based on inferential or analytical processes applied to 
selective features of the situation, task, or process, it is understandable that 
metacognitive experiences and metacognitive knowledge can differ among 
different individuals (e.g., a task is represented differently by the teacher and the 
student), and this implies that there are individual differences. For example, some 
individuals tend to be more confident than others regardless of the task (Dunlosky 
& Rawson, 2012). Moreover, there can be differences in the same individual from 
one occasion to the other (within subject variation), depending on the cues, beliefs, 
or information being implicated in the representation process. For example, 
judgments of learning can change as the person learns more about a topic and better 




Furthermore, monitoring can be inaccurate, if the cues used are not valid for 
the "object" that is being represented. For example, if the person is heeding 
mnemonic cues such as fluency and not cues related to the accuracy of the recalled 
information, then the relation of metacognition with performance can be low or 
non-existent. Specifically, a fluently retrieved answer to a question can be 
associated with high confidence that it is correct even though it is not (Koriat, 1997; 
Schwartz & Efklides, 2012). Such a discrepancy between metacognitive 
experiences or knowledge and performance accuracy has implications both for the 
reliability and validity of metacognitive experiences and metacognitive knowledge 
(e.g., relations with performance). 
 
Effectiveness of Control Decisions 
 
Inaccurate monitoring of cognition has implications for the effectiveness of 
control decisions. For example, a highly confident response prevents further 
engagement with the same task although checking of response accuracy is needed 
before concluding memory search or problem solving. Or, confidence that one will 
recall in a future test a particular piece of information (judgment of learning, JOL, 
Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991) in comparison to another one influences allocation of 
study time to the individual items. If JOLs are inaccurate, then allocation of study 
time is also flawed.  
 
Affect, Metacognitive Experiences and Control 
 
Metacognitive feelings are influenced not only by cognitive but also by 
affective factors, such as mood (Efklides, 2006, 2011; Efklides & Petkaki, 2005). 
Moreover, cognitive conditions such as cognitive interruption give rise to both 
metacognitive and affective reactions, namely feeling of difficulty and surprise 
(Touroutoglou & Efklides, 2010; for the role of surprise in relation to 
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metacognition see also Metcalfe & Finn, 2012). This implies that control responses 
such as increased effort or time on a task can be triggered by metacognitive 
monitoring factors but also by cognitive or affective factors, directly or indirectly 
(see Figure 1). To put it differently, cognitive conditions such as familiarity, 
fluency of processing, interruption, conflict, or error are monitored at a cognitive 
level (Touroutoglou & Efklides, 2010; Van Veen & Carter, 2002) and 
automatically trigger control processes, such as increased effort or time on the task. 
At the same time, the outcome of monitoring reaches conscious awareness in the 
form of feelings (metacognitive or affective, e.g., feeling of familiarity, feeling of 
knowing, confidence, satisfaction, pleasure, surprise, curiosity) and control 
decisions can be made based on these feelings if cognitive control fails.  
 













Since cognitive events or the person's affective state can automatically trigger 
regulatory processes (i.e., at the "object" level) this can take place even before 
metacognitive feelings are consciously analysed and used for deliberate control 
decisions. Metacognitive control presupposes metacognitive awareness of the task, 
metacognitive experiences, and/or metacognitive knowledge. Specifically, since 
metacognitive feelings are non-analytic and inferential in nature, attributions and 
metacognitive knowledge of the factors that might have produced these feelings are 
activated when the person tries to make sense of their experiences and the task. 
Hence, conscious control at the personal awareness level that is initiated by 
metacognitive experiences may involve the person's more general knowledge, 
affect, perception of the task context, metacognitive knowledge or even social 
metacognition. 
Having outlined the enriched model of metacognition and its implications for 
understanding the multiple facets and functioning of metacognition, I am turning 
now to research evidence that supports the claim that monitoring being inferential 
in nature, can be accurate or inaccurate depending on the cues and attributions 










Monitoring accuracy is important for a number of reasons (see Hattie, 2013): a) it 
informs on the compatibility of new with prior knowledge. For example, inaccurate 
feeling of familiarity may lead to rejection of new knowledge as irrelevant or 
treating something old as new; b) it determines the level of effort needed –more or 
less effort depending on task demands and experienced difficulty; c) it can trigger 
already available or effective strategies or avoid use of new strategies; d) it can help 
a person realize their actual level of knowledge and decide where they should be 
targeting. That is, people often set their own standards for a task (e.g., rote learning 
instead of deeper processing and comprehension); e) it can interfere with help 
seeking (e.g., ask help when not needed or on less important points rather than on 
critical issues). In what follows, I shall present evidence showing that monitoring 




There are two ways in which to measure monitoring accuracy of metacognitive 
experiences: Calibration or absolute accuracy and resolution or relative accuracy. 
Calibration refers to the extent to which monitoring (e.g., in the form of confidence 
or JOLs) reflects the overall accuracy of response. Resolution refers to the ability to 
differentiate correct from incorrect responses or between items of different levels of 
difficulty (Schwartz & Efklides, 2012). The two measures of monitoring accuracy 
are related but not identical: One can be well calibrated, that is, show small 
discrepancy between performance and monitoring overall (e.g., students can quite 
accurately predict their final grades in a course), but not very successful in 
resolution (e.g., predict their performance at specific tasks, Hattie, 2013). Evidence 
from both measures of monitoring accuracy suggests that in many cases monitoring 
is inaccurate. What is this evidence and what does it suggest for the mechanism that 




The discrepancy between confidence judgments and task performance is well 
documented in metacognition literature. Overconfidence is a classical example. 
People are much more confident in the correctness of their response than their 
actual performance is. The curse of being ignorant and not being aware of it is the 
epitome of this phenomenon (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, 2002). Prior knowledge is 
a critical factor for the accuracy of confidence judgments and calibration. As 
Hacker, Bol, Horgan, and Rakow (2000) showed, students in the top 20% of 
attainment in a university course were well calibrated in the prediction (before 
exams) and post-diction (after exams) of their performance, and even a little 
underconfident. The rest 80% of students were overconfident and those in the 
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lowest quintile of performance were the most overconfident. Dinsmore and 
Parkinson (2013) also showed that low ability students are less accurate in 
calibration (i.e., overconfident), have less skills at learning, and are less likely to 
know they are inaccurate and how close they are to desired learning (see also 
Hattie, 2013). 
Miller and Geraci (2011) found that even with feedback on the accuracy of 
their current performance students' predictions of their future learning were 
overconfident. This was also found by Dunlosky and Rawson (2012). What is 
interesting in the latter study is that when students were asked to self-score their 
responses and were given idea units for checking the correctness of their answers, 
even then they self-scored higher than the feedback they had from the idea units. 
Idea units is a way of summarizing the main points of a text and thus checking 
one's comprehension. Students could check in an one-to-one manner their response 
against the idea units, and then self-score. Overconfidence means that they scored 
themselves higher than what the comparison of their response with idea units 
suggested. Despite the biased self-scoring, feedback helped students reduce their 
overconfidence and become better calibrated. Thus, high prior knowledge and 
realistic feedback are two factors that contribute to monitoring accuracy.  
But corrective feedback may not suffice for monitoring accuracy if the task is 
new or the person cannot understand the basis of correct response (Efklides, 2012; 
Pieschl, Stahl, Murray, & Bromme, 2012; Redford, Thiede, Wiley, & Griffin, 
2012). Feedback is essential for confidence and learning provided it informs on 
what is being learnt and what success looks like (Hattie, 2013). Prior knowledge is 
also necessary but not sufficient for the accuracy of monitoring, because there are 
individual differences factors that influence confidence irrespectively of prior 
knowledge or feedback (Efklides, 2012; see also Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012). That 
is, overconfidence as a person characteristic can be moderated but not eradicated. 
Moreover, as Hattie (2013) suggested, having no prior knowledge may be more 
conducive to accurate monitoring than partial or inaccurate prior knowledge 
because the person is aware of their ignorance and more open to feedback. 
The dissociation between accuracy and confidence was confirmed in another 
study in which participants had the option to generate a single answer consisting of 
one alternative or a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other 
alternatives (Luna, Higham, & Martin-Luengo, 2011). Each answer was rated for 
confidence or the likelihood of being correct, while one of the answers was selected 
for reporting. Participants selected single answers when their accuracy and 
confidence were high. They opted for plural answers when accuracy and 
confidence were low. What is worth noting is that response accuracy was higher for 
selected plural than single answers but the opposite pattern was found in the case of 
confidence or correctness likelihood ratings. These findings suggest that 
participants had significant overconfidence as regards single answers but under-
confidence as regards plural answers. 
Efklides, A.: 
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The opposite of overconfidence is under-confidence. It has been found that 
practice can lead to under-confidence, which is also a manifestation of poor 
monitoring accuracy. Meeter and Nelson (2013) showed that judgments of learning 
after one study trial were overconfident but after two study trials under-confident in 
terms of absolute calibration. However, relative calibration was not influenced by 
study trials. Hadwin and Webster (2013) also showed that people become less 
overconfident with time as regards the calibration of their goal setting. This means 
that with practice people may focus on different cues for their monitoring. It is 
plausible that practice increases awareness of the various cues (intrinsic, external, 
mnemonic1
Hattie (2013) suggested that students may have two sources of information for 
their calibration. They may know when they know (i.e., calibration of success) but 
not when they do not know (i.e., calibration of failure). This means that students do 
not necessarily recognize which items they get incorrect (see van Loon, de Bruin, 
van Gog, & van Merriënboer, 2013), and hence overconfident. This can be due to 
the use of invalid cues for judging their response, namely ease of processing, 
familiarity, amount of information retrieved rather than the quality of information. 
However, with practice students get information on what they do not know, and 
this decreases their confidence in the accuracy of their response.  
, Koriat, 1997) that are indicative of response accuracy and of the 
factors that may have an effect on one's performance. This increases awareness of 
the potential of error even if actual performance is correct. This could explain why 
high achieving students are often under-confident.  
Hypercorrection. There is another phenomenon that is worth mentioning with 
regard to confidence accuracy and its relation to performance: It is the 
hypercorrection of responses that were endorsed with high confidence (Metcalfe & 
Finn, 2012). That is, students correct most readily responses that had been given 
high confidence ratings initially. This is counterintuitive because high confidence 
means that the person believes that the answer is correct and hence should not be 
changed. The condition for hypercorrection is corrective feedback (Metcalfe & 
Finn, 2012). When students in multiple- choice questions were given corrective 
feedback not only did they change their highly confident response but said they 
"knew it all along". How could students judge their incorrect response as correct if 
they knew the correct answer all along? The "knew it all along" experience 
suggests that participants did not have access to the correct response but rather their 
initial confidence was based on some inference that it was correct. Then, when the 
correct response was presented the cues changed and the students felt they knew it 
from the past. 
 
                                                          
1 The cues on which metacognitive experiences rely can be (a) extrinsic, such as the context 
in which the task takes place, for example the number of study trials; (b) intrinsic to the task, 
such as task features, and (c) mnemonic cues, that are related to the fluency with which the 
task is encoded or the answer retrieved. 
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JOLs and Memory Performance 
 
In a recent paper with Bennett Schwartz (Schwartz & Efklides, 2012) we 
reviewed evidence showing cases in which judgments of learning (JOLs) and other 
metacognitive experiences matched or not actual memory performance. The 
theoretical framework used was Koriat's (1997) and the claim is that metacogntive 
experiences are more accurate when the person focus on extrinsic rather than on 
intrinsic or mnemonic cues. Moreover, people can use their metacognitive 
knowledge for their judgments rather than only cues (see also Koriat, Bjork, 
Sheffer, & Bar, 2004). Let's take some examples: 
 
1. The timing of JOLs – Immediate or delayed JOLs. One of the very first 
findings in JOL research was the remarkable improvement in the accuracy of 
JOLs when they were made more than 10' after studying (Nelson & Leonesio, 
1988). When JOLs are made after the learned material has been retained in 
long-term memory and judgments are based on cues diagnostic of actual 
memory of the items, they are more accurate.  
The importance of focusing on cues related to retrieval rather than encoding 
fluency was also shown by Koriat and Ma'ayan (2005). McCabe and 
Soderstrom (2011) replicated this effect; they asked participants to make 
judgments of remembering and judgments of knowing. The former are based 
on contextual information whereas judgments of knowing are not based on 
details of retrieval but on confidence. Judgments of remembering (recollection 
based) were more accurate than judgments of knowing. Therefore focusing on 
encoding fluency only or retrieval cues can make a great difference for JOLs 
irrespectively of actual memory.  
2. The effect of stimulus perceptual characteristics. Larger font size and 
loudness increase JOLs, that is, people predict better learning, although 
memory performance is not affected (Rhodes & Castel, 2008, 2009). In a 
related study words were presented in inverted form (Sungkhasetee, 
Friedman, & Castel, 2011). This treatment increased effort for encoding 
("desirable difficulties", Bjork, 1994) and consequently led to better retrieval 
later on. However, JOLs did not predict this memory effect: The expectation 
was for lower retrieval. Obviously in both of these cases people are basing 
their judgments on encoding fluency rather than on the monitoring of actual 
memory. 
3. Relatedness and overlearning. When learning paired associates (e.g., tree – 
nurse) people predict better learning (JOLs) when the pairs to be learnt seem 
related (e.g., money – doctor) compared to unrelated pairs, although 
relatedness does not affect memory (Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). Moreover, 
delaying JOLs improves the accuracy of JOLs of unrelated pairs but not those 
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of the seemingly related pairs. This means that relatedness is a very strong 
cue, possibly emanating from beliefs about factors that influence text 
comprehension. Only when feedback on memory accuracy was provided did 
JOLs on seemingly related pairs improve, which is possibly part of people's 
MK about the task.  
In another study it was found that even if the unrelated pairs were studied 
more times than the related ones, so that overlearning is achieved, JOLs were 
sensitive to relatedness but not to overlearning (Carroll, Nelson, & Kirwan, 
1997), which is external cue. That is, people focus on relatedness even if it is 
not indicative of retrieval and not on overlearning, which a highly potent 
condition for learning and memory (Schwartz & Efklides, 2012). 
4. Memory for past test performance. In cases where there is repeated study of 
items and repeated JOLs, people are basing their JOLs on whether an item 
was successfully recalled in the past rather than on the number of trials in 
which the item was presented. That is, people underestimate repetition as a 
factor affecting memory and rely more on their experience of remembering an 
item in the past (Finn & Metcalfe, 2007, 2008; see also Ariel & Dunlosky, 
2011). The monitoring of memory performance seems to be a general strategy 
people use even in cases of no repetition. When asked to make predictions of 
how long they are going to remember information (judgments of retention), 
they do monitor recall performance and make more accurate judgments than 
when making JOLs. This suggests that the wording of the required judgment 
may be important for the information people monitor in order to form their 
judgments (Tauber & Rhodes, 2012). 
5. Stability bias. JOLs reveal that people underestimate future forgetting and 
overestimate remembering (Kornell, 2011). For example, in a study by Koriat 
et al. (2004) participants learnt paired associates and made JOLs for a recall 
test to be taken 10 min or one week later. JOLS did not differ between the two 
groups. This suggests that participants based their judgments on encoding 
fluency rather than on the anticipated retention interval. Participants did not 
take into consideration forgetting. However, when the judgment was about 
forgetting, the difference in the retention interval (10' and one week) did 
differentiate judgments, although actual forgetting was still higher than 
anticipated. Thus, it seems that people are aware of forgetting in longer 
retention intervals but this metacognitive knowledge does not influence JOLs 
when they are experience-based. However, when retention interval was made 
salient through instructions for several retention intervals, JOLs were more 
representative of the actual recall rates. In this case JOLs were theory-based, 
that is, in accordance with MK about forgetting. 
Also, people are aware of forgetting in cases of directed forgetting (Bjork, 
1970), that is, when instructed not to remember something. In a recent study, 
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participants studied words each of which was followed by a cue (R: 
Remember or F: forget). Then they made JOLs and then free recalled the list 
of items. Both recall and JOLs were sensitive to the R-F cue. People 
accurately predicted forgetting in their JOLs (Friedman & Castel, 2011), 
which means that people have some kind of MK (theory, belief) that people 
can forget things if instructed to do so.  
6. Primacy and recency effect. The primacy and recency effect in the free recall 
of single word lists is well known in memory research. People in free recall 
conditions recall best the last items (recency effect), then the first in the list 
items (primacy effect) and least of all the items in the middle of the list. 
However, JOLs for items to be free recalled later on do not reflect this effect 
contrary to memory performance (Castel, 2008). When participants were 
given information on the primacy and recency effect and were not shown the 
items for making their JOLs but only the position of the item in the list, then 
their JOLs became more accurate. This finding is similar to the theory-based 
JOLs found by Koriat et al. (2004) and stresses the importance of 
metacognitive knowledge in the formation of judgments about future recall. 
However, MK can be overridden if encoding fluency becomes the major cue – 
this is the case when the list items are presented rather than their position in 
the list.  
7. List length. Tauber and Rhodes (2010) found that JOLs did not accurately 
reflect the list length effect, that is, the lower probability of recall of the items 
of longer lists compared to items of short lists. However, when participants 
were instructed on the phenomenon and had practice, then JOLs became more 
accurate. This underscores again the importance of MK. 
 
To sum up, the reviewed studies suggest that JOLs or confidence judgments 
can be flawed if they rely on an encoding fluency heuristic and not on retrieval 
cues. However, metacognitive judgments can be improved and monitoring can be 
quite accurate when the person has prior knowledge that allows the evaluation of 
retrieval correctness, when the person is given corrective feedback, and when the 
person has metacognitive knowledge on the functioning of memory and the factors 








Research on metacognitive experiences by large ignores MK, although in order to 
explain some of the findings one needs to assume there exists MK even if not 
directly measured. Because of the importance of MK of strategies for the control of 
cognition and particularly the need to teach strategies (cognitive or metacognitive) 
for improving the quality of control decisions, most of the research on MK regards 
the use of strategies and how this knowledge develops in young children. Also, 
strategies in specific domains of expertise such as reading, writing, text 
comprehension or mathematics have been investigated (e.g., Cromley & Azevedo, 
2011; Pressley & Gaskins, 2006). Students' awareness of learning strategies has 
also received extensive attention in educational research. However, MK about 
persons and tasks is less well studied. In this article I shall refer to less well studied 
aspects of MK and particularly knowledge of one's self and tasks in which one has 
experienced fluency (or lack of it) in processing.  
 
Metacognitive Knowledge of Self and Task 
 
MK of tasks. Ackerman and Goldsmith (2011) found that students prefer 
studying from printed hard copy rather than computer screen. One group of 
students studied a text of three pages in printed form and another on computer 
screen. Then they answered a multiple- choice test on the text. When the study time 
was fixed, the two groups did not differ in their test performance. When study time 
was self-regulated the group studying the text on screen had lower performance 
than the hardcopy group. The authors concluded that the difference in performance 
was not cognitive but metacognitive, that is, less accurate prediction of 
performance and more erratic study time regulation on screen than on paper. This 
evidence suggests that students have beliefs about the means in which they are 
fluent and less fluent, and this MK may be flawed. Nevertheless, this MK guides 
their control decisions with implications for performance.  
Metacognitive knowledge of self. Efklides and Vlachopoulos (2012) directly 
tested the assumption that students have MK about the tasks in which they are 
fluent, that is, are easy for them, and MK about the difficulty/easiness of tasks. 
Students' responses on the Metacognitive Knowledge of Self, Task, and Strategies 
in Mathematics questionnaire confirmed this prediction. There were two factors on 
MK of the self (easiness /fluency vs. difficulty/lack of fluency in mathematical 
notions), two factors on MK of tasks (easy vs. difficult mathematical tasks) and 
three factors on MK of strategies: One factor representing cognitive and 
metacognitive strategies, one representing strategies for enhancing competence in 
mathematics, and one on task avoidance. What is important is that MK of self 
(easiness/fluency), rather than MK of task, along with mathematical ability 
predicted younger students' performance on mathematical problems. Moreover, 
MK of self (easiness/fluency) was negatively related to prospective judgments of 
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feeling of difficulty. This finding shows the possible effects of MK on ME. Two of 
the three factors of strategy use (cognitive/metacognitive strategies and 
competence-enhancing strategies) also predicted the prospective judgments of 
feeling of difficulty but not the retrospective judgments. The MK of the self 
(fluency) was negatively related to feeling of difficulty and so did the competence-
enhancing strategy use. Unexpectedly, use of cognitive/metacognitive strategies 
was positively related to feeling of difficulty. This suggests that these strategies are 
applied in response to experienced difficulty during mathematical problem solving, 
and this MK is used as a basis for ME on later occasions. However, in university 
students MK of the self seems to have been incorporated into their self-concept of 
mathematics and performance was predicted by self-concept. Despite this, MK of 
the self (difficulty/lack of fluency) positively predicted prospective judgments of 
feeling of difficulty. To sum up, MK of the self and strategies is particularly 
important for the formation of prospective ME during problem solving and can 
even predict task performance. 
It needs to be also stressed that competence-enhancing and avoidance 
strategies are not cognitive strategies but rather related to motivation and affect. 
This implies that students have an integrated representation of themselves as self-
regulated learners in a domain. This MK can contribute to self-regulation either 
directly or indirectly through affect.  
 
Metacognitive Knowledge of Strategies 
 
MK of strategies can tap broader categories of strategies as in the Efklides and 
Vlachopoulos (2012) study, or more specific strategies such as learning strategies. 
McCabe (2011) found that university students could not accurately predict the 
learning outcomes of educational scenarios describing strategies such as dual 
coding, static vs. multimedia presentations, low interest extraneous details, self-
testing, and spacing. Students showed weak endorsement of the strategy of 
generating one's own study materials. This means that students did not have well 
developed theories about factors affecting learning or the use of strategies that can 
enhance memory of learning materials. However, students who had followed 
courses on memory and learning at a postgraduate level and had extensively 
worked on relevant applied memory research increased the accuracy of their 
predictions of educational outcomes of learning scenarios. This is a clear case of 
socially-mediated metacognitive knowledge of strategies. People can have MK 
based on their experience and monitoring of their performance but this knowledge 
can be changed through instruction.  
In school students are being taught strategies in specific knowledge domains. 
Thus, students have MK of strategies they use, e.g., in reading, or even knowledge 
of strategies they do not endorse themselves. When measures tap more specific 
strategies students use, e.g., in reading, then this MK can predict comprehension. 
Efklides, A.: 
Metacognition and Regulation of Learning 
17 
However, MK of strategies or strategy use itself does not suffice to explain 
performance outcomes. MK of strategy use explains a small percentage of 
performance variance. Cognitive ability factors, such as vocabulary, background 
knowledge and word reading (Cromley & Azevedo, 2011) explain a significant 
percentage of performance variance. This finding is in the same direction as 
Efklides and Vlachopoulos (2012), and suggests that metacognitive awareness of 
strategies does not suffice for the explanation of cognitive processing outcomes. 
What is important is what strategy the person actually uses during task processing. 
More importantly, Efklides and Vlachopoulos (2012) showed that students are 
using various strategies for the regulation of their learning in various knowledge 
domains which reflect motivation and affective concerns and not only cognitive or 
metacognitive regulation. 
 
Relations Between Monitoring and Control 
 
To exercise control or use a strategy there needs to be, besides the task itself, some 
cue or input that signals the necessity for a control decision. Familiar tasks trigger a 
habitual or automatic processing mode without the person being aware of it. 
However, automatic processing can fail or lead to undesired performance 
outcomes. Awareness of error is one of the cues that make the person aware of the 
need for strategy change and/or deliberate strategy use. In novel tasks, on the other 
hand, the person has no learned strategy to be automatically triggered. In such cases 
conscious and deliberate control is needed right from the beginning. Awareness of 
novelty (lack of familiarity), task complexity or task difficulty requires goal setting 
and conscious and deliberate control. And of course, strategy use can be part of task 
instructions. However, metacognitive experiences, such as feeling of familiarity, 
feeling of difficulty, feeling of knowing, confidence or JOLs, also trigger control 
decisions. The trigger can also be MK of the self or strategies that inform the 
person of prior encounters with the task or subjective task demands. In the case of 
task demands or instructions goal setting and strategy use is a top down process and 
metacognitively controlled. In all other cases strategy use is metacognitively or 
affectively guided and can be part of bottom up regulation of cognition (Efklides, 
2011).  
One implication of the above framework of strategy use is that control 
decisions can be non-optimal because ME can be flawed. Moreover, students have 
difficulty in self-assessment and this limits their ability for task selection (Kostons, 
van Gog, & Paas, 2012) and effective self-regulated learning. However, observing 
a human model engage in self-assessment and/or task selection or practicing these 
skills can help students improve their control decisions, based on social level 
awareness. As Haider, Frensch, and Joram (2005) claim, strategy change is not an 
automatic consequence of task practice. When people learn a new strategy, they are 
aware of it and can describe the task regularities that allowed for the generation and 
application of the new strategy. Moreover, they can transfer this knowledge to new 
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tasks. But if their experience suggests that the new strategy cannot be used to the 
entire range of problems they are working on, then they do not opt to use the new 
strategy. That is, one needs to determine the exact conditions for the application of 
a strategy and this is a long learning process that feeds on the person's MK of 
strategies regarding the conditions of strategy use. Furthermore, students need to be 
motivated for strategy use. Vrugt and Oort (2008) found that students in SRL 
follow two paths: one from motivation to metacognition to study strategies and one 
from motivation to strategy use directly.  
To sum up, strategy use is triggered by task characteristics, prior knowledge 
(skills) of strategies, metacognitive knowledge of strategies, metacognitive 
experiences that inform on processing demands, and, finally, motivation and affect 
that inform on the value of strategy use and provide the energy needed for the 
exercise of control and strategy use. In what follows, I shall review evidence on the 
effects of the various factors involved in strategy use. 
 
Task Difficulty and Task Instructions: Habitual vs. Controlled Processing 
 
Although item or task difficulty is a critical factor for strategy use, Dunlosky and 
Ariel (2011) found that students often do not take into consideration task demands. 
In their study students preferred to study items in a left to right or top down order 
regardless of item difficulty. That is, habitual processes or automatic cognitive 
processing guided students' control decisions. However, in one of their 
experiments, Dunlosky and Ariel (2011) presented items in a sequential order from 
difficult to easy and vice versa. Participants were allowed to choose half of the 
items for restudy. This condition raised participants' awareness of item difficulty, 
and the instruction to select items for restudy enhanced a top-down self-regulation 
mode. In this case students tended to select items that had been presented before in 
the list rather than follow habitual processing. This suggests that students can 
follow both a bottom-up (habitual) and a top-down (controlled) mode of self-
regulation in learning.  
 
Item Difficulty and Affect  
 
Detecting item or task difficulty is critical for effective control decisions. One way 
to do this is to rely on one's own experience of feeling of difficulty. Efklides and 
her collaborators (2006, 2011; Efklides & Petkaki, 2005; Touroutoglou & Efklides, 
2010) have studied feeling of difficulty, that is, the subjective experience that arises 
as response to item difficulty, the monitoring of interruption of cognitive 
processing, conflict, or increased probability for error. It is this unpleasant feeling 
that alerts the person on lack of processing fluency, the presence of a problem or 
the possibility of committing an error. Feeling of difficulty is the interface between 
the person and the task, because it is determined by objective task difficulty (in 
terms of complexity or working memory demands), the person's ability, mood, and 
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MK of the self or self-concept in a task domain. Of course, feeling of difficulty can 
be flawed as all other ME, that is, a difficult task can be perceived as easy 
(Efklides, 2002). Nevertheless, it can inform on the need for effort expenditure 
(Efklides & Petkaki, 2005), strategy use or strategy change (Efklides, Samara, & 
Petropoulou, 1999). Moreover, it can trigger affective regulatory strategies such as 
avoidance or competence-enhancing ones (Efklides & Vlachopoulos, 2012). 
Finn (2010) also investigated the effect of affective factors such as discomfort 
due to effortful learning experience on prospective study choices. People remember 
their hedonic past and often disregard the duration of the experience. They are 
influenced by the peak of and the final levels of discomfort and base their decision 
for future study on this information. Thus, students who had an extremely effortful 
study episode extended by a more moderate interval preferred such a schedule to a 
shorter, unextended interval, although test performance was higher following the 
shorter interval. Efklides, Kourkoulou, Mitsiou, and Ziliaskopoulou (2006) also 
showed that students have MK about effort and its affective or cognitive outcomes. 
Thus, for some students effort is a positive and effective means for achieving their 
goals and there are no negative sides to it. For others, effort is a negative experience 
that is associated with bodily symptoms, exhaustion, discomfort, and inefficiency. 
For these students the preferred control decision is the early abandoning of effort or 
avoiding effort altogether. 
Autin and Croizet (2012) tested the assumption that difficult tasks subtly 
generate concerns about incompetence. They carried out an intervention study in 
young students in which they reframed the metacognitive interpretation of 
difficulty as indicative of learning rather than self-incompetence. The alleviation of 
concerns improved children's working memory and reading comprehension. 
Therefore, metacognition can contribute to control decisions but strategy use is 
influenced by affective and task factors and not only by MK and ME. 
 
JOLs and Study Time Allocation  
 
One of the metacognitive experiences that has received extensive attention in 
relation to control is judgments of learning. JOLs are sensitive to objective 
difficulty of the material, and students allocate study time according to their JOLs. 
However, students learn better the easy items than the difficult ones. That is, they 
do not manage to compensate for item difficulty (Pelegrina et al., 2000). Moreover, 
if they give too much study time to the difficult items then they run the risk of 
"labor-in-vein", because they still do not recall them compared to the easy ones 
(Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). However, the labor-in-vein effect is present only when 
students are in control of study time. If study time is restricted, then students 
change strategy and study easy items more (Son & Metcalfe, 2000). This suggests 
that students regulate their study time more flexibly and take into consideration 
both item difficulty and time available for study. 
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Based on such evidence Metcalfe (2002, 2009; Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006) 
proposed the theory of the Region of Proximal Learning (RPL). According to the 
theory students in the context of limited study time should focus on the easiest 
items not yet mastered and then move on to more difficult ones if there is still time. 
They should, however, avoid very difficult items because the probability of 
learning these items is very low. In this way they avoid the labor-in-vein effect and 
maximize learning. Kornell and Metcalfe (2006) found that students spontaneously 
apply the strategy of the RPL, which facilitates decision on what items to study or 
not. 
On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that higher JOL accuracy (e.g., 
delayed JOLs that make better prediction of recall) does not necessarily lead to 
better control decisions. Specifically, Kimball, Smith, and Muntean (2012) found 
that the benefit of delayed JOLs was due to the selection of more items to restudy 
rather than to better discrimination between which items to restudy. This suggests a 
dissociation between monitoring and control, and that control may be informed by 
one's prior use of strategies rather than monitoring of the learnability of items. 
 
Judgments of Improvement and Strategy Selection 
 
To follow the RPL strategy presupposes that students monitor their improvement in 
learning as they study. That is, they need to know when to quit studying an item 
that they already mastered or quit trying altogether because the rate of learning 
drops with little or no progress in the course of learning. Townsend and Heit (2011) 
found that judgments of improvement were poorly correlated with memory 
performance but correlated with change in JOLs. This implies that students 
monitored the changes in learning based on their ME and not actual performance. 
Still JOLs were not the only predictors of judgments of improvement: sense of 
fluency, interest, frustration and other non-cognitive factors seem to contribute to 
the formation of judgments of improvement (Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005). Indeed, as 
Carver and Scheier (1998) propose, there is monitoring not only of the outcome of 
processing and discrepancy reduction between one's goal and performance but also 
monitoring of the rate with which one reaches their goal. This monitoring gives rise 
to affect, positive or negative, as well as a hazy expectation that the goal can or 
cannot be reached depending on whether the discrepancy reduction is faster or 
slower than anticipated. This implies that strategy selection is associated with 
monitoring as the model of metacognition posits, but also with affective factors as 
stated above. 
 
Stability Bias and Retrieval Practice 
 
One of the most powerful findings in memory research is that repeated testing (or 
self-testing) of a certain material brings better recall than restudying of the same 
material. However, students do not use repeated recall or self-testing as a strategy 
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for improving learning. Karpicke (2009) compared three groups of students who 
had to learn a number of items for later recall. The first group practiced repeated 
testing, the second restudying and the third group could remove items that had been 
successfully recalled after recall. In the condition in which the strategy was 
controlled by instructions (e.g., teacher controlled) the first group had best learning 
and retention. However, when students could select the strategy for learning, the 
preferred strategy was to remove items. This led to poor retention. The benefits of 
retrieval practice were further shown by Karpicke and Smith (2012), who 
compared retrieval practice with restudying that was accompanied by elaborative 
study conditions. Elaborative studying benefitted initial encoding but did not affect 
long-term retention contrary to retrieval practice that improved long-term memory. 
This suggests that students believed erroneously that once something is learnt 
(short-term retention) it is maintained in memory (see stability bias) and does not 
need to be repeated again through retrieval practice. 
Rawson, O'Neil, and Dunlosky (2011) found that self-test and evaluation of 
one's learning before selecting passages for restudy improved recall compared to 
restudy of selected passages only. However, students self-tested not because they 
appreciated the importance of the strategy of retrieval practice but because they 
wanted to evaluate their progress so that they could know how much more they 
need to study. Therefore use of the retrieval practice strategy may indicate the 
influence of motivational factors rather than metacognitive knowledge of strategies.  
The effect of self-testing became even stronger when the evaluation of 
responses was made with the use of idea units, that is, the main ideas that should be 
included in the response. This suggests that self-testing as a control strategy for the 
learning of complex material may not suffice: accurate feedback is required, 
because only then monitoring can be accurate and translate into effective SRL (see 
also Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012; Lipko et al., 2009). 
 
Massed vs. Spaced Study 
 
The beneficial effects of spaced study, that is, study distributed over time, are also 
well known in memory research. However, students usually prefer massed study 
rather than spaced. Toppino and Cohen (2010) investigated students' use of spaced 
study. They found that learners' preference for spaced practice increased with 
greater item difficulty. This finding is consistent with a discrepancy-reduction-like 
account of metacognitive control or an agenda-based regulation of learning. This 
explanation was further tested in another experiment of the Toppino and Cohen 
study, in which item difficulty and point value for the final test were included. 
Learners preferred spaced practice for items with high than low value, and this 
decision was unaffected by item difficulty. This finding supports the agenda-based 
account of selection of learning strategies and underscores the importance of 
motivational factors in strategy use.  
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A similar finding with regard to allocation of study time was found by 
Soderstrom and McCabe (2011). Participants allocated study time based on item 
value and relatedness, which influences JOLs as we have already seen. Therefore 
there was monitoring of item difficulty and prediction of learnability but study time 
allocation was not a function of metacognitive monitoring only. Motivation, in the 
sense of value attached to task performance, is crucial for the initiation of agenda-
based regulation. 
 
Control and Resources 
 
It is very important to bear in mind that control can be ineffective for other reasons 
besides inaccurate monitoring. For example, use of strategies is effortful and the 
person may fail to control their behavior because of limited resources. For example, 
initial efforts at executive control (e.g., controlling the focus of attention) 
temporarily undermine subsequent efforts at executive control (Schmeihel, 2007). 
This phenomenon is explained with the limited resource model of executive 
control.  
The limited resource model also explains why self-control has considerably 
higher costs than self-regulation (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998). Self-control is a 
temporary means to accomplish the initiation or maintenance of goal-directed 
behavior that is not yet an integral part of one's self. Self-regulation, on the other 
hand, serves the concurrent satisfaction of a majority of short- and long-term 
personal needs that represent an integrated self (self-maintenance) when pursuing a 
goal. 
To sum up, the evidence presented in relation to control argues in favor of a 
model of self-regulated learning in which there is both top-down and bottom-up 
regulation. ME offer the input for bottom-up regulation whereas motivational 
factors favor a top-down process. However, control is facilitated or constrained by 
the availability of resources and affective factors. These ideas are at the core of the 
Metacognitive and Affective model of Self-Regulated Learning (MASRL; 
Efklides, 2011) that extends previous SRL models by integrating metacognition 





At the beginning of this article I posited three questions: (a) Does monitoring 
accurately represent cognition? (b) Is control informed only by metacognitive 
monitoring and (c) How effective is control in the regulation of cognitive 
processing and/or behavior? 
As regards the first question the evidence suggests that monitoring in the form 
of ME and MK does not always accurately represent cognition and the factors that 
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influence the outcome of cognitive processing. Moreover, people do not pay 
sufficient attention to task and context characteristics that have a direct effect on 
processing outcomes and performance.  
The answer to the second question is that control is not informed only by 
metacognitive monitoring. Rather, control is triggered by task, cognitive, affective, 
and motivational considerations as well as metacognition.  
The answer to the third question is that control is not effective in cases in 
which the monitoring input for the control decision is inaccurate. However, 
monitoring may be accurate but the person do not have at their disposal the 
appropriate strategies, or habitual ways of responding prevail over metacognitively 
informed ones. Furthermore, monitoring can be accurate but strategy use fails 
because it requires resources for effortful processing and there is depletion of 
resources.  
 
Implications for Future Research 
 
What are the implications for research on metacognition?  
1. Research on monitoring, particularly JOLs, is extended and has led to 
significant theories in the field. However, each ME has its own characteristics 
and it is possible that different cues are involved in the formation of each of 
them. For example, self-assessment is different from JOLs, and feeling of 
difficulty monitors lack of fluency rather than fluency which is at the core of 
feeling of knowing or JOLs. Moreover, there are suggestions in calibration 
research to use two different calibration indicators one depicting monitoring of 
correct responses and one depicting monitoring of incorrect responses or error 
(Schraw, Kuch, & Gutierrez, 2013).  
2. Research on control processes in metacognition has been largely focusing on 
the use of cognitive or metacognitive strategies in specific domains. However, 
a broader conception of control is needed (e.g., cognitive, executive, 
metacognitive, volitional) that can highlight the interrelations between the 
various manifestations of control and their relations with monitoring. The 
constraints on control due to limited resources has to be further pursued as 
well. For example, use of metacognitive strategies or skills can be highly 
demanding when first taught and this may have adverse effects on problem 
solving or learning of new content knowledge. 
3. Research on ME has been largely independent from research on MK. The 
relations between the two facets of monitoring need to be more systematically 
explored. For example, the reasons for making a confidence judgment may 
differ between people (Dinsmore & Parkinson, 2013), and this may have 
implications for the accuracy of monitoring and the interactions of monitoring 
with control processes. And, of course, the distinction between explicit vs. 
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implicit MK needs to be further developed and investigated as to its 
implications for monitoring and control.  
4. The interrelations between cognition and affect have been explored in social 
psychology since the 1980s. However, the relations of affect with 
metacognition are only in their beginning. Research in this direction can 
highlight the integrated nature of human consciousness and lighten the nature 
of monitoring and control processes. 
5. There is growing research on social metacognition but still this work is 
limited. The effects of social factors on both individual and collaborating 
peers' ME, MK and control is of great importance. This will highlight possible 
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